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Abstract
Who could disagree with the seemingly common-sense reasoning that: “We must learn from the things that go 
wrong.”? Despite major investments to improve patient safety, relatively few evaluations demonstrate convincing 
reductions in risk, harm, serious error or death. This disappointing trajectory of improvement from learning 
from errors or Safety-I as it is sometimes known has led some researchers to argue that there is more to be 
gained by learning from the majority of healthcare episodes: the things that go right. Based on this premise, so-
called Safety-II has emerged as a new paradigm. In this commentary, we consider the ongoing value of Safety-I 
based approaches and explore whether now is the time to abandon learning from “the bad” and re-energise data 
collection and analysis by focusing on “the good.”
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Internationally, it is now widely acknowledged that healthcare-associated harm poses a major threat to public health and wellbeing.1 As long ago as 2002, the World 
Health Assembly called for urgent action to address this 
problem.2 Almost immediately, a number of health systems 
responded to this call to arms, which involved having at the 
core of their mission a drive to learn from medical errors and 
adverse events through patient safety incident reporting and 
learning systems. The assumption was that such a process 
would identify systemic weaknesses that contributed to the 
error(s) and capture the learning from these, which could then 
be used to prevent future recurrences. Who could disagree 
with the seemingly common-sense reasoning that: “We must 
learn from the things that go wrong.”? Each incident report 
would be “a window on the healthcare system.”3 Moreover, 
the improvements in other safety critical industries owe much 
to the analysis of data from reports of incidents – both near 
misses and accident investigations.4-6 
Yet, major investments to establish patient safety have yielded 
relatively few evaluations that have demonstrated convincing 
reductions in risk, harm, serious error or death. This 
disappointing trajectory of improvement from what has been 
characterised as Safety-I has led some researchers to call for 
different thinking.7-9 Instead, it has been argued that there is 
more to be gained by learning from the majority of healthcare 
episodes: the things that “go right.” From this position, so-
called Safety-II has emerged as a new paradigm. Descriptions 
of the role of Safety-II in health care improvement have been 
judged as “confused or overlapping, or are ambivalently 
expressed.”10 In this Journal, Mannion and Braithwaite propose 
a more nuanced, compromised position where Safety-I and 
Safety-II approaches coexist in the interests of maximising 
insights to support health systems improvement.11 
Achieving Analytical Primacy – Four Challenges for Safety-
II
Proponents of Safety-II have a strong case for a paradigm shift 
in preventing harm. At the outset, though, to achieve analytical 
primacy, Safety-II has to address four key concerns. First, that 
the generation of harm in healthcare, through system failure, 
is similar to other sectors. These sectors have used learning 
from this perspective to good effect.4,12 Second, growing 
expertise within a small number of research groups worldwide 
is yielding powerful insights into the causes of preventable 
harm, which will we believe in time lead to the development 
of interventions that can then formally be evaluated. We take 
heart from examples like the PINCER trial, a pharmacist-led, 
information technology-based intervention used to minimise 
a range of medication errors. PINCER demonstrated that it is 
possible to move from insights from descriptive and qualitative 
work to developing medication safety interventions which are 
then shown to be clinically effective and cost-effective.13,14 
PINCER is now being rolled-out as a routine implementation 
study across a much larger population base. This work needs 
more support. Third, the harrowing, unsafe care experiences 
of patients and their families depicted in incident report 
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databases represent a unique perspective for learning and 
should not be overlooked. The volume of data in many is 
now so great that much have never been analysed or used 
to support improvement.15,16 Organisations are hindered by 
lack of investment for building capacity and capability of staff 
to analyse such data.15 The public would surely be horrified 
to learn of this inability to honour those that have suffered. 
Healthcare leaders should not be comfortable about this. To 
not even bother to look at a story of a patient’s experience of 
harm inflicted by the health system is a long way from the 
core value of respect. Finally, given the very significant data 
analysis challenges posed by the very high volume of patient 
safety incidents now being reported, we need to be very 
wary of trying systematically to analyse and learn from and 
feedback to reporters on the very high number of episodes of 
care that go right. In relation to this last point, our argument 
is based on pragmatic considerations.
Lessons Learnt From Safety-I
Following the report of a public inquiry into a wholesale 
failure in standards of care in an English hospital, the founder 
of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Donald M 
Berwick was asked by the United Kingdom government to 
conduct a review of patient safety. In his report, A promise to 
learn - a commitment to act: improving the safety of patients 
in England17 he highlighted that “organisational learning 
is key to improving patients’ safety.” This echoed previous 
recommendations made in An Organisation with a Memory18 
over a decade earlier, and suggests the National Health Service 
(NHS) had been slow to realise how to generate and act on 
learning from healthcare-associated harm. 
Berwick stated:
“Organisations should demonstrate that they have in place 
fully functional reporting systems for serious incidents, that 
staff know how to use them, that the systems are used, and 
that appropriate action is taken in response to incidents, 
including provision of appropriate support to the affected 
patients and their carers.”17 
Epidemiological studies of advanced healthcare systems 
find the same systemic failures and sources of healthcare-
associated harm – for example, surgical complications, falls in 
healthcare facilities, medication errors, pressure ulcers, and 
others – recur year after year in many countries.19 Incident 
reporting systems have contributed a reveal on how systems 
could be designed to minimise future risk to patients. For 
example, a third of patient safety-related hospital deaths in 
England involved poor management of the deteriorating 
acutely ill patient,20 sometimes called “failure to rescue.” 
Similarly, learning from primary care reports has highlighted 
options for error-proofing the design of systems in general 
practice,15 between primary and secondary care,21 and 
highlighting risks to specific patient groups including older 
adults and children.22-25 
The difficulty with Safety-I is not that it has held back an 
understanding of unsafe systems. It is that few reliable ways 
have been found to strengthen how the learning is used to 
improve the healthcare system in a way that sustains a risk 
reduction. There have also been limited opportunities, and 
in some respects ability, to undertake detailed investigations 
of incidents of the kind that are needed to help develop 
interventions. Whilst research groups have provided some 
insights to help decide which incidents to focus attention on, 
many have been reluctant to take the difficult step of moving 
to intervention development and testing. We recognise doing 
this kind of research is challenging, largely arising from 
the relative infrequency of actual harm such that surrogate 
measures are often needed, which do not appeal to funders or 
high impact journals.
Reporting and Learning Systems for Safety-I and -II 
Reporting systems can be used to identify trends and patterns 
of avoidable incidents and their causes (including near 
misses), opportunities to develop evidence-based models 
for safe practices and support for education and learning. 
Similarly, they have potential to capture learning from 
episodes of peer-reported excellence or positive deviance.26 
However, quality improvement, informed by rigorous analysis 
from local patient safety incident management systems, are 
the exception. Too much data are collected and too little are 
done with it.27 This apparent lack of demonstrable progress 
probably deters reporting since few staff see the rewards 
of their conscientiousness in trying to protect patients. 
Not closing the feedback loop to incident reporters has in 
some cases led to frustration and disillusionment. An open 
reporting culture that staff can trust, and have confidence 
their concerns will be acted upon, is a prerequisite to building 
safer care.4,17
Our efforts to tackle patient safety in primary care have 
been enriched by lessons from our analysis of over 60 000 
patient safety incident reports. We have come to learn that 
the benefits of incident report analysis are supported by 
a structured analysis of free-text information about what 
happened, perceived contributory factors and actions to 
prevent future occurrences. To achieve this, we developed 
a taxonomy aligned with the World Health Organization’s 
(WHO’s) International Classification for Patient Safety to 
support future global knowledge sharing, and our method for 
generating learning is now used in six countries.15 Crucial to 
our success has been the application of the Recursive Model of 
Incident Analysis, developed by the Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation,28 for organising our analysis and identifying 
salient relationships in coded data.15,21,23-25 Our diagnostic 
approach has generated multiple recommendations for quality 
improvement in primary care (as quality improvement plans 
in a format called a driver diagram),21,22 and is informing the 
design of a national primary care patient safety improvement 
agenda in Wales. 
From gaining clarity on definitions of patient safety incidents 
in primary care, we produced Royal College of General 
Practice “how to” guidance and e-modules to support primary 
care teams to identify, report and learn from patient safety 
incidents, as well as suggestions on how to include patients 
and families in this process.29,30 In this guidance, we also 
advocate that the analysis of incident reports be an essential 
step in ‘diagnostics’ when planning a quality improvement 
project. A similar trajectory of work is needed to support 
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staff to report excellent care. This should be the case right 
across the healthcare continuum and organisations should be 
asking how analysis of incident reports can regularly inform 
their improvement agendas. One organisation in Wales, 
United Kingdom, used our methods to analyse patient safety 
incident reports about anticoagulation error. The subsequent 
improvement project demonstrated fewer delays in discharge, 
hospital acquired pneumonias and other complications, and 
created demand for legislative amendments to The National 
Health Service (Wales) Act to put systems into practice to 
improve anticoagulation safety across the country.31 
Based on our experience of research using patient safety 
incidents, particularly in primary care, we believe an incident 
reporting system should: 
•	 Be designed to understand why unsafe (or near miss), 
suboptimal, or excellent care occurred;
•	 Use the WHO Minimal Information Model,32 particularly 
to ensure reporters describe what happened, perceived 
contributory factors and the patient outcome;
•	 Permit identification of priority concepts for improvement 
that minimise or prevent safety risk (Safety-I) and bolster 
the positive processes (Safety-II) that matter to the 
workforce and to patients; 
•	 Raise hypotheses for research, particularly informing 
the design of interventions for testing (moving from 
feasibility to pilot trials and eventually full trials) and 
implementation (using quality improvement methods), 
as well as be used to corroborate insights from existing 
research studies; and,
•	 Use an existing internationally accepted conceptual model 
for understanding patient safety, the WHO International 
Classification for Patient Safety,33 to allow global sharing 
of data for exchange of solutions for common areas of 
challenge and maximise opportunities to learn from rare 
events. 
Conclusion
If used to their full capacity, and crucially if they are subject 
to further development in analytical methods and tools, we 
believe that patient safety incident reporting and learning 
systems have a crucial part to play in making healthcare 
safer. Powerful exemplars of improvement driven by local 
and national incident reporting systems demonstrate their 
potential. Healthcare leaders, and their organisations, 
must be responsible for developing robust mechanisms to 
ensure patient safety incident reporting systems capture 
essential information that can inform improvement efforts, 
be systematically interrogated and used to redesign care 
processes. Frustration with their lack of impact has helped fuel 
the concept of Safety-II. We agree with the latest articulation 
of Safety-II in that there is also a need to learn from what goes 
well, ie, safe episodes of care, is important. Leaders should 
proactively and simultaneously seek signals for improvement 
from unsafe, suboptimal and excellent care.
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